Dworkin has stated: "Political rights are creatures of both history and morality; what an individual is entitled to have, in a civil society, depends on both the practice and the justice of its political institutions." 6 Dworkin's theories also appear in his approach to constitutional adjudication:
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 19:195 Our constitutional system rests on a particular moral theory, namely, that men have moral rights against the state. The difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights, like the due process and equal protection clauses, must be understood as appealing to moral concepts rather than laying down particular conceptions: therefore a court that undertakes the burden of applying these clauses fully as law must be an activist court, in the sense that it must be prepared to frame and answer questions of political morality.7
More recently, Alan Dershowitz has developed a system of rights based on experience with wrongs, which he calls "nurtural" rights. 8 He asserts that "rights are those fundamental preferences that experiences and history-especially of great injustices-have taught are so essential that the citizenry should be persuaded to entrench them and not make them subject to easy change by shifting majorities." 9 He views the essential problem of a system of rights as the source of those rights; otherwise, they could not trump majoritarian (democratic) preferences. 10 He rejects both God and nature as the source of rights.
11 He also refuses to use the ideal as a basis of rights, declaring "[i]t is more realistic to try to build a theory of rights on agreed-upon wrongs of the past that we want to avoid repeating, than try to build a theory of rights on idealized conceptions of the perfect society about which we will never agree."
12 Instead, he "identifies the most grievous wrongs whose recurrence we seek to prevent, and then asks whether the absence of certain rights contributed to those wrongs." 13 Dershowitz acknowledges that, because his system has no external source, he can only advocate his theory.
14 However, he declares, "[i]f there can be agreement that certain rights are essential to reduce injustice, such agreement constitutes a solid theory of rights." 15 Neither Dworkin's nor Dershowitz's approach is convincing because both approaches lack a source for their rights. 16 One cannot accept rights based on faith: faith often becomes ideology. Rights should be unchangeable (or at least not easily changed), and rights cannot be unchangeable without a source. Dworkin is not clear concerning his source of rights, and, as noted above, Dershowitz admits that his theory has no external source, and his optimism concerning obtaining a consensus on rights is questionable.
rights, and rights to equal treatment. Finally, it will examine some implications of a biological basis of rights.
The final part will illustrate how biological rights exist in different cultures. It will first examine how rights based on human behavior developed in the American constitutional system; then it will compare the concept of liberty in American and German law.
II. PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION
Behavioral biologists study human nature from an evolutionary perspective. 22 They connect patterns of "genes through neural activity to brain circuitry and behavior." 23 They believe that the human brain evolved similarly to human physical characteristics, such as opposable thumbs and walking erect. 24 In other words, the human brain evolved through natural selection "to make decisions that enhance reproductive success." 25 Likewise, "complex functional human psychological and behavioral traits are the results of adaption through natural selection." 26 Behavioral biologists study human behavior using methods that allow them to analyze behavior in ways that were unimaginable just a few years ago. Evolutionary psychologists examine how subjects react while playing various "games," such as the prisoners' dilemma or the ultimatum game. 27 Psychologists also analyze how brain deformities alter human behavior, 28 while other scientists study childhood development. 29 Comparative anthropologists investigate behavior across cultures. 30 Finally, 22 Behavioral biology encompasses many fields including evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, etc. 23 24 Graefrath, supra note 17, at 367-68 ("Darwinism gives a most plausible biological explanation of the origins of the human brain with all its capacities."); Sharon Street, A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value, 127 PHIL. STUD. 109, 113 (2006) . For example, Professor Marc Hauser believes that humans possess an innate morality, which is "more like growing a limb than sitting in Sunday school and learning about vices and virtues . . 1633, 1644 (2007) . 27 E.g., GAZZANIGA, supra note 25, at 133-34. 28 Id. at 119-20. 29 Id. at 165-68. neuroscientists examine the brain using techniques such as fMRI scans 31 and investigate the brain's chemistry. 32 Natural selection is the main force behind evolution. As one scholar has stated: "Differential reproduction of genetically different forms, or evolutionary selection, is the only candidate for the principal guiding force of evolutionary change." 33 Under natural selection, genes compete with other alleles (variations of the gene), and "those alleles that are better at securing the reproductive success of their organisms are likely to spread in the gene pool to the detriment of the others." 34 As Professor Marc Hauser has noted: "Natural selection builds organisms with complex design features based on a nonrandom but directionless process. Poorly-designed variants are eliminated, better-designed ones favored." 35 Similarly, "[i]n evolutionary theory, an 'adaptation' is a biological trait, physiological, psychological, or behavioral, shaped by natural selection to enhance the fitness of members of a species." 36 As Professor John McGinnis has observed, "[s]ince resource acquisition ability was important to the genetic fitness of our ancestors, traits that contributed to this ability were selected over time in any given population." 37 Another aspect of evolution is sexual selection. Sexual selection is the competition for mates and reproductive opportunities. 38 Human males and females make different contributions to reproduction, with females making the most valuable contribution in that they provide the egg, internal fertilization, gestation, and lactation and they bear most of the responsibility for raising their offspring. 39 Because females contribute the most important resources and they can have only a limited number of offspring due to gestation, males must compete for females. 40 Males who are better at attracting mates reproduce and continue their genes, while males that cannot attract mates do not. 41 Thus, nature selects against those males who are not good at attracting mates. Characteristics that attract females indicate traits that the mate will produce strong offspring, traits 31 E.g., GAZZANIGA, supra note 25, at 124-26, 168-71. 32 Id. at 175-76. 33 Kuklin, Peril] . 35 HAUSER, supra note 24, at 312. See also Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 24, at 167. "If a change in an organism's design allows it to outreproduce the alternative design in the population, then that design change will become more common-it will be selected for." Id. In addition, "the fitness of a gene is determined, at least partially, by its ability to coordinate well with the other genes it finds itself with in its particular genome." Bailey Kuklin ISSUES 211, 223-24 (1997) . 38 Kuklin, Peril, supra note 34, at 194-95. 39 Id. at 195; PINKER, supra note 24, at 252. 40 Kuklin, Peril, supra note 34, at 196-97; PINKER, supra note 24, at 252 ("Males compete, females choose; males seek quantity, females quality."). 41 Kuklin, Peril, supra note 34, at 205. such as physical attractiveness, social status, good health, and intelligence, as well as traits demonstrating that the male will help the female raise the child and be a good-faith mate, such as kindness, faithfulness, and the ability to obtain resources. 42 While certain mate preferences overlap among the sexes, there are also significant differences in preference because of the different investments in and benefits from mating. 43 Males prefer mates who are attractive (an indicator of being young and healthy and having good genes), make commitments, and would be a good mother. 44 Behavioral biologists believe that the brain is modular, with each module having a specialized function (domain-specific reasoning procedures), and that these modules interact to produce a thought or an action and that they can "reinforce or cancel one another out, according to context." 45 209 . "It appears our brains have neuronal circuits that have developed over evolutionary time that do indeed do specific jobs." GAZZANIGA, supra note 25, at 127. 46 HAUSER, supra note 24, at 291. Professor Pinker thinks we have at the least: 1) an intuitive physics, 2) an intuitive version of biology or natural history, 3) an intuitive engineering, 4) an intuitive psychology, 5) a spatial sense, 6) a number sense, 7) a sense of probability, 8) an intuitive economics, 9) a mental database and logic, and 10) language. PINKER, supra note 24, at 220-21. Professor Paul Rubin has pointed out that specialized modules developed because a general purpose mind that could deal with everything in the EEA was too costly. PAUL H. RUBIN 53 Noam Chomsky has conjectured that there is a "universal grammar," which underlies all human languages. 54 Professor Raffaele Caterina has declared that " [p] eople from different cultures, and scientists, recognize substantially the same discontinuities in nature, demonstrating that classification of living organisms is not just a matter of cultural conventions." 55 Professor Donald Brown has uncovered hundreds of universals including classification, crying, daily routines, envy, etiquette, facial expressions, jokes, law, leaders, logical notions, play, and social structure. 56 Even art is a universal.
57
Behavioral biologists believe that morality (our sense of right and wrong) is a universal that is hardwired into our brains (a "universal moral grammar") and that has aided survival. 58 Moral judgments are generally intuitive and unconscious; they often occur automatically and allow us to make rapid judgments. 59 For example, humans developed an innate incest 51 As Professor Flew has remarked, "any universal natural rights will have to be grounded upon some characteristic or characteristics common to all humankind. taboo that causes a person to be sexually uninterested in a person that he or she lived with as a child, a trait which developed to discourage inbreeding with its genetic costs. 60 However, there are also times when abstract moral reasoning is required, such as when conflicting moral judgments are involved. 61 In addition, individuals often work out moral dilemmas with others; morality is partly a social process. 62 In sum, much of our morality is based on moral intuition, but man is also capable of conscious moral judgment and sometimes morality develops through a social process. 63 Morality doesn't derive from a single module in the brain; rather, it is produced by several modules in combination. 64 FMRI scans have revealed that "when people confront certain kinds of moral dilemmas, they activate a vast network of brain regions, including areas involved in emotion, decision-making, conflict, social relations, and memory." 65 Professors Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph have proposed that there are five moral modules: (1) harm/care ("a sensitivity to or dislike of signs of pain and suffering in others"); (2) fairness/reciprocity; (3) authority/respect ("a set of concerns about navigating status hierarchies, e.g., anger towards those who fail to display proper signs of deference and respect"); (4) boundaries between in-groups and out-groups (coalitions); and (5) purity/sanctity ("relating to the emotion of disgust"). 66 In addition, fMRI scans show the effects of emotion on moral reasoning. People distinguish between types of moral dilemmas (such as direct versus indirect harm) based on the regions of the brain activated. 67 For example, when direct physical harm is involved (e.g., pushing one person off a footbridge to stop a trolley from killing five people-the "trolley problem"), most individuals have an emotional reaction that causes them to think intuitively and come to an immediate conclusion that this action is wrong. 68 The brain region involved in this process is the ventromedial prefontal cortex, which integrates affective responses (emotion) with higher cognition. 69 However, when the same outcome involves indirect harm (e.g., throwing a switch to shift a trolley from killing five people to a track that kills one), individuals do not have the same response with a different part of the brain being involved, and they often exhibit a utilitarian reaction in which one person is sacrificed to save five. 70 This suggests that intuitive moral responses involve emotion, and they activate different parts of the brain than utilitarian reasoning.
Humans can recognize the emotional states of others, and they "have the ability to form theories with some degree of accuracy about what those desires, intentions, beliefs and mental states are." 71 In other words, humans have "the ability to observe behavior and then infer the unobservable mental state that is causing it." 72 This is "a theory of mind, a more-or-less automatic understanding of what it means to be someone else." 73 Most significantly, "[h]uman nature provides a yardstick to identify suffering in any member of our species." 74 "Individuals recognize actions made by others because the pattern of firing neurons [mirror neurons] made when observing an action is similar to the pattern produced to generate the action." 75 Professors William Casebeer and Patricia Churchland have described how mirror neurons work:
The behavior of the "mirror neurons" suggests that when seeing the other make the movement, the premotor cortex generates incipient motor commands to match the movement. It is possible that these signals can be detected as intentions, albeit off-line intentions, which are used to interpret what is seen (e.g., "he intends to share food"). 76 In other words, an individual understands an action because he has a template in his brain for that action based on his own movements; 77 humans put themselves in the other person's place. 78 Moreover, social cognition also depends on the ability to form triadic mental representations of mental states-You, Me, and This (an object), which allows sharing attention to an object and collaborating on a shared goal ("shared intentionality").
79
Mirror neurons help us understand the emotions of others. 80 For example, fMRI scans suggest that "the understanding of the facial expressions of disgust in someone else involves the activation of the same part of the brain that normally is activated during the experience of that same emotion."
81 Understanding the emotions of others helps us navigate our lives; "[i]f our brains were not able to discriminate at emotional level events perceived, remembered, or imagined, it would be almost impossible for us to deal with even the most banal of the situations that we have to face daily."
82 Furthermore, "[b]y being able to feel what others feel, we are also able to respond compassionately to their emotional states." 83 There are specific neural circuits in the brain that allow one to distinguish between oneself and others (self-awareness), 84 both physically and psychologically. 85 Professor Gazzaniga has stated that the "sense of self arises out of distributed networks in both hemispheres. It is likely that both hemispheres have processing specializations that contribute to a sense of self, and that sense of self is constructed by the left-hemisphere interpreter on the basis of the input from the distributed networks." 86 Professor Marco Iacoboni has elaborated: "The mirror neurons embody both the interdependence of self and other-by firing for the actions of both-and the independence we simultaneously feel and require, by firing more powerfully for actions of the self." 87 In addition, the brain may have "super mirror neurons," which are involved in creating a proper sense of the self.
88
Our self-awareness and theory of mind contribute to our moral judgments of responsibility. 89 93 However, empathy is not just automatic; it can be affected by such factors as "the affective link to the other person, the perceived fairness of the other, the subject's appraisal of whether the reason the other person is suffering is justified, the frequency of a person's prior exposure to pain-inducing situations and the intensity of the inflicted pain." 94 Finally, not all moral emotions are "nice."
95 Emotions involving shaming, ostracism, and revenge are part of human nature. 96 Similarly, disgust protects against disease (lack of purity). 97 Even fear is an important moral emotion because it can affect our moral choices.
98
Neuro-cognitive universals also exist in the law, which is not surprising considering the relationship between morality and law. 99 For example, Professor Brown has discovered numerous universals that are relevant to law including a concept of fairness, distinguishing right and wrong, inheritance rules, murder proscribed, property, rape proscribed, reciprocal exchanges of labor, goods, or services, redress of wrongs, sanctions, sanctions for crimes against the collectivity, and some forms of violence proscribed. 100 Professor George Fletcher has asserted that there is a "deep universal structure of criminal law."
101 Professors Owen Jones and Timothy Goldsmith have claimed that one can see the effects of the evolutionary process on the human brain in the architecture of legal systems. 102 A related set of professors has proposed that humans probably share a sense of 90 justice concerning deserved punishment, which arose from the social nature of humans through evolution. 103 Furthermore, Professor Peter Strahlendorf has theorized that Darwinian algorithms ("the interaction between information in gene-determined structures and environmental information that occurs in the functioning of cognitive programs") 104 underlie our sense of justice. 105 He has explained: "It is the Darwinian algorithms that are [evolutionary] adaptations, . . . the algorithms are solutions to problems, the solving of which must have resulted in greater reproductive success of individuals in the past." 106 The mind also has cognitive limitations-" [t] here are things it cannot do, cannot learn, and cannot comprehend." 107 Our cognitive abilities were developed for survival-"[i]f an organism repeatedly comes across the same situation, any individual that evolves a mechanism to understand or predict the results of the situation is going to have a survival advantage." 108 Consequently, our cognitive limitations exist because mankind did not need all skills on the primate savannah. These limitations apply to moral reasoning: "[f]rom an evolutionary perspective, the survival of the animal depends on its maintaining its inner milieu within a very narrow range of values." 109 In other words, strong moral relativism does not exist.
C. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Culture provides the details of human behavior. The development of culture aided survival in the EEA in light of differing geography, ecology, and social circumstances. 110 Professor Hauser has written that "[c]ultural variation is only possible because of specialized psychological mechanisms that enable particular forms of learning." 111 Similarly, Professor Pinker has observed that "familiar categories of behavior-marriage customs, food taboos, folk superstitions, and so on-certainly do vary across cultures and have to be learned, but the deeper mechanisms of mental computation that generate them may be universal and innate." 112 For example, all cultures proscribe murder, but the exceptions to murder vary by culture. Finally, Judge Morris Hoffman has argued: "Perhaps all behaviors are represented in the brain by a set of probability distributions which are then continuously influenced by the interaction between ultimate causes (the initial probabilities evolution built into our brains) and proximate causes (the particular environmental challenges brains are called upon to solve Man learns the details of a culture through imitation by exposure to that culture's social norms. 118 The ability to imitate others is innate and often unconscious. 119 As Professor Hauser has observed, "[t]he role of experience is to instruct the innate system, pruning the range of possible moral systems down to one distinctive moral signature." 120 More specifically, mirror neurons create a connection between the observation and imitation of an action.
121 Under this process, "the action as observed and as executed must share the same neural code and that this is the sine qua non condition for imitation." these modules: (1) the ethic of autonomy (suffering and reciprocity), which is concerned with an individual's rights, freedoms, and welfare; (2) the ethic of community (hierarchy and coalitional boundaries), which is concerned with protecting families, communities, and nations; and (3) the ethic of divinity (the concern for purity), which involves the spiritual self and physical and mental purity. 125 An environmental trigger activates the input into these modules; they then elicit moral emotions, and moral intuition (output) ensues.
D. THE SELFISH GENE AND RELATED TOPICS
An important concept in behavioral biology is the notion of the selfish gene. Behavioral biologists believe that genes are selfish; they are only interested in their survival.
127 Judge Hoffman has written: "[i]ndividuals, not groups, are the functional units through which genes act, and social norms become adaptive only because they confer a net benefit to individuals." 128 The first goal of the selfish gene is the organism's survival, and the second is reproduction.
129
Various mechanisms, such as reciprocal altruism, natural morality, pain, and a notion of fairness, evolved to counteract the selfish gene and make man a social animal, thus aiding survival. People cooperate when they trust others to cooperate (reciprocal altruism). 130 Therefore, cooperation is a byproduct of the selfish gene-cooperation aids survival. 131 In other words, being selfless comes from being selfish.
Natural morality, through the emotions of anger, indignation, and gratitude, also helps control the selfish gene. 132 Because humans can sense the feelings of others, they anticipate that others will become angry and retaliate when they are cheated.
133 Moreover:
It can be to a selfish person's advantage to have moral sentiments that are visibly expressed by moral emotions, which predispose him not to cheat. Pain is also an important social emotion. When an individual experiences social rejection, that individual suffers pain. 135 Avoiding this pain helps keep the group together and thus aids in its survival. 136 Similarly, shame and guilt help prevent humans from violating social norms. 137 Finally, man is born with an innate sense of fairness, with the details of fairness being set by the local culture. 138 In fact:
The psychology of fairness in our own species is rich, including some ability to keep tabs, to place subjective values on different entities and actions, to judge when an inequity has transpired, to distinguish accidental from intentional giving and reneging, and to determine when an act is worthy of retribution."
E. BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY, SOCIETY, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Mankind flourished because it came together into social groups, which produced a survival advantage (reciprocal altruism on a large scale). Professor David Barash has asserted: "[t]he basic concept of 'society' assumes give and take, often called a 'social contract,' whereby individuals make what is essentially a deal with society at large. Each will forego certain selfish, personal opportunities in exchange for profiting from the cooperation of others."
140 Professor Gazzaniga has proposed that "all those social relationships we worry about intensely are merely by-products of behavior originally selected to avoid our being eaten by predators."
141
Groups that cooperate internally prevail over selfish groups for survival.
142
As Professor Gazzaniga has declared: "[w]ithout all those others, without our alliances, we die."
143 For example, cooperation in hunting was important for human evolution because it created a supply of meat for protein and energy that allowed us to grow big brains. 144 Furthermore, 134 Id. at 131. 135 Man can live in large groups because humans are innately able "to monitor social behavior in large groups so that we may access the value of cooperation, the risk of noncooperation, and so on."
146 Under the social contract, most "people don't mind paying 'their fair share,' once they are convinced that (1) it is in fact fair; and (2) others are doing the same." 147 On the other hand, people stop cooperating when others are cheating. 148 Cheating violates and undermines the social contract.
Societies must, therefore, be able to control cheaters (free riders) and prevent excessive status-seeking. Punishment is the glue that holds societies together; without punishment, society would fall apart.
149 Animals expend energy (use resources) to reduce or avoid punishment.
150 When individuals are punished, "the individuals in the group benefit because they are less likely to be subject to violence, theft, or cheating," 151 thus increasing their chances of surviving and reproducing. For example, gossip, which affects reputation, may have evolved as an early way to restrain cheaters. 152 Similarly, as Professor Haidt has averred: "the combination of language and a full theory of mind made it possible for large groups of nonkin to reap the benefits of cooperation by monitoring each other's behavior (with gossip), shunning or punishing cheaters, and rewarding team players." 153 145 HAUSER, supra note 24, at 60. See also Kar, supra note 99, at 891. 146 GAZZANIGA, supra note 25, at 80; HAUSER, supra note 24, at 274 ("[I]t is likely that evolution equipped us with a specialized ability to work through the cost-benefit analysis of a social contract."); PINKER, supra note 24, at 285 (declaring that "the logic of social contracts may have propelled the evolution of the mental faculties that keep us in these groups."). 147 BARASH, supra note 128, at 137. 148 Id. at 152; Ben Seymour et. al., The Neurobiology of Punishment, 8 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCI. 300 (2007) ("In humans, however, punishment also appears to adopt an important role in promoting and preserving cooperation."). See generally Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005) ("When a person evaluates particular legal rules, decisions, or practices as unjust, the diminished respect for the legal system that follows can destabilize otherwise law-abiding behavior."); PINKER, supra note 24, at 261 (noted that individuals differ genetically in their selfish tendencies). 149 GAZZANIGA, supra note 25, at 129 ("If cheaters take over, reciprocity crumbles."); HAUSER, supra note 24, at 77, 99, 390, 403-08 ("If the payoffs to defection are higher than the payoffs to cooperation, individuals defect." Id. at 77.); BARASH, supra note 128, at 136 ("The best-perhaps the only-solution is for external constraints to force individuals to cooperate, because otherwise they won't."); Boyd et. al., supra note 142, at 3533 ("[A]dding punishment sustains substantial amounts of cooperation in much larger groups."). See generally Özgür Gürerk et. al., The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions, 312 SCIENCE 108 ("Profound empirical evidence shows that the possibility of sanctioning norm violators stabilizes human cooperation at a high level, whereas cooperation typically collapses in the absence of sanctioning possibilities."); Haidt, Emotional Dog, supra note 58, at 826 (only man has "widespread third-party norm enforcement"). Similarly, Justice Holmes stated: "If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 150 Seymour, supra note 148, at 300. 151 Robinson et. al., supra note 26, at 1650. 152 GAZZANIGA, supra note 25, at 94-97. See also BARASH, supra note 128, at 153 ("Also, don't overlook the role of social punishment, administered by other 'players' who stand to lose if someone in their group is stingy or a shirker."); HAUSER, supra note 24, at 81. 153 Haidt, Emotional Dog, supra note 58, at 826.
Behavioral biologists believe that the human brain has a special module to detect social cheaters. 154 For example, facial expressions and voice tone can often reveal a cheater because of the effect of the underlying emotions. 155 Similarly, humans' shared emotions, which are triggered when cheating occurs, motivates societies to punish cheaters. 156 People even punish cheaters when it is costly to themselves (altruistic punishment) because punishing cheaters promotes cooperation and is a fitness indicator for sexual selection. 157 Further, it might be immoral not to punish cheaters, and the cost of punishment is reduced when undertaken by a group. 158 Moreover, because culture is learned through observation and is passed from generation to generation, punishment becomes a behavioral-cultural norm, thus allowing "the outcome of punishment to be learned without personal transgression." 159 In addition, punishment and other law help to create trust within the group. 160 In sum, law and punishment help maintain reciprocal altruism within a group when the opportunity for personal interaction is impossible because of the group's size. 161 F. HUMAN NATURE, "OUGHT," AND RIGHTS Behavioral biologists do not believe that what is natural is necessarily good or that nature creates "musts." 162 What was adaptive on the savanna may no longer be proper today. 163 Obviously, violence was part of our evolutionary past, but this is not a human behavioral trait that we want to encourage in our modern world. In addition, "[t]he proper evolutionary use of a domain may be quite different from its current use." 164 Consequently, as Professor Edward Wilson has noted, our innate characteristics "have to be played like a musical instrument, with some parts stressed to produce results of great beauty and pleasure (by terms of the human limbic system) and other parts sublimated and averted." 165 Therefore, "[t]he step from is to ought requires a special justification." 166 For instance, "if there is a kind of 'natural' tendency for male domination, but we find it morally obligatory that females have the same moral status as males, biological knowledge can help us determine what the most promising course of action will be to counter the 'natural' tendency that we cannot justify." 167 On the other hand, "[n]ature may . . . limit what is morally possible, and suggest ways in which humans . . . are motivated into action." 168 One reason to base a theory of rights on biology is that it is easier to adopt a positive natural trait than to repress it since it is part of the human behavioral system. 169 172 Therefore, it would be easier and more efficient to enforce positive human traits, than to repress them. This is especially true with rights because, as noted above, a moral system is built into our brains.
Equally important, normative statements about rights should be predicated on facts; "ought" needs to be grounded in "is." As Professors Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund have declared: "If moral facts are anthropocentric facts, then it follows that normative ethics cannot be done in a vacuum, applicable to any rational creature anywhere in the universe."
173 Furthermore, "[w]hen not properly grounded, entire schools of metaethics can be invalidated by empirical studies…."
174 Theories about rights should not contradict scientific facts, but rather be grounded in science. The theory of rights proposed in this paper is grounded in science.
III. BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF RIGHTS
A. INTRODUCTION
It is the thesis of this paper that a universal system of basic rights is hardwired into our brains (a universal grammar of rights), just like morality is hardwired into our brains. In fact, rights relate to our innate ability to tell 167 HAUSER, supra note 24, at 3; Graefrath, supra note 17, at 370. See also PINKER, supra note 24, at 299 ("Because social conventions are not adopted to human nature alone, a respect for human nature does not require preserving all of them."). 168 right from wrong. Like morality, 175 our hardwired rights are general principles with the details of these rights being specified by particular cultures. In other words, we have an innate toolkit for building a system of rights.
176 Among these rights are (1) property rights; (2) a right to basic fairness; (3) liberty rights; and (4) a right to be treated equally.
177 These innate rights are not a minimum, but rather a foundation.
Behavioral biology demonstrates the need for rights. First, behavioral biologists have established that humans are sentient, autonomous beings who have a moral sense. 178 As Professor Haidt has stated, "Thomas Jefferson's declaration that certain truths are 'self-evident' is an example of ethical intuitionism." 179 Despite the traditional (and now totally discredited) social science theory of man as culturally constructed, the human mind is not a blank slate that allows for easy social engineering-human nature cannot be rewritten. 180 Rather, all humans are defined by the inner workings of their minds, and they share a similar genetic makeup. In addition, as Kant believed, human beings are morally special because they have the capacity for rational choice and the freedom of rational beings should be respected. 181 For example, psychology experiments, such as the trolley problem discussed above, have shown that "it is permissible to cause harm as a by-product of achieving a greater good, but it is impermissible to use harm as a means to a greater good." 182 Finally, autonomy helps the individual survive. 183 Second, rights help hold the social contract together. Social contracts involve "commitment" problems which are "any dynamic, strategic problem in which an individual can obtain more desirable or self-interested results by giving up certain options or by guaranteeing others-in short, by making commitments."
184 A person will not voluntarily give up her selfish interest (commit or remain committed) when that person is subject to the tyranny of a majority of which that person is not a part of. Similarly, part of our evolved nature is the freedom to leave our group and join another one to avoid coercion by dominants. 185 In other words, "[e]xit freedom had the effect of imposing constraints on dominant individuals in the group: if a few powerful individuals got too powerful, they risked loss of members, and thus some of the net advantage of living in groups. Likewise, even the majority in any group had to keep a keen eye on majoritarian excess."
186
Rights help solve the commitment and exit problems by protecting individuals from the tyranny of a majority and creating trust. 187 While an individual will not always win what he or she wants in the political process, rights will protect that individual from overreaching by the majority. In other words, rights grant a minimum for each person under the social contract, which encourages that person to give up his or her selfish interest, to remain a member of that community, and to further both the individual's and community's ability to survive. As Judge Hoffman has declared:
The deepest social connections that bind us bind us only because, in the end, we are free to disregard them. They have become powerful precisely because they must have had enough long-term utility to overcome their short-term costs, and to keep us from exercising our freedom to exit the group.
188
Of course, in order for rights to help hold the social contract together, society must punish those who violate others' rights. A third reason for the existence of rights is to prevent violence and increase the chances for survival. Professor Barash has declared: "What isn't arbitrary is the underlying idea: the success of strategies that settles conflicts with a minimum of violence." 189 In other words, when rules settle disputes, no one is harmed and genes are passed on.
Another justification for rights is to compensate for flaws in human nature. 190 As Professor Pinker has written, "[i]n the Tragic Vision, humans are inherently limited in knowledge, wisdom, and virtue, and all social arrangements must acknowledge those limits."
191 Society must protect individuals from nepotism, selfishness, competition for social status, and power seeking. Hierarchy is part of human nature, and while it is necessary for a functioning society, rights must be protected within the hierarchy.
192
Individuals must be safeguarded from those who govern; otherwise, the social contract will break down. Similarly, humans need to be protected from group coercion. Finally, societies with a system of rights work better freedom to leave the group and to join another."); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 24 (1991). One might ask why more civilized societies have not had a strong system of rights. The answer is that a dictator can often limit exit freedom, Hoffman, supra note 109, at 1673, and that to exit, there must be somewhere to go. 186 and further the survival chances of their inhabitants. For example, "no functioning democracy with political rights has ever suffered a famine."
193
While the above demonstrates justifications for rights, the question remains what their source is within human biology. As will be shown in detail below, rights come from the following sources: (1) the autonomy of human beings (liberty rights; a right to equal treatment); (2) reciprocal altruism, which is part of the social contract (rights are what an individual gets from entering into the social contract-property rights, fairness, etc.); (3) rights that arose as a solution to an evolutionary problem (certain property rights arose as a method to avoid harm and violence); and (4) our innate morality (most rights). Some rights have a combination of sources as their basis. In addition, our inner sense of morality helps define these rights, and these rights aided survival.
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS
Several scholars believe that property rights are hardwired into human brains, that there are "identifiable patterns in the resolutions of disputes over resources."
194 Professor Jeffrey Stake thinks that property rights evolved to avoid harm to individuals: "[r]ivals can reduce the costs of competition by adopting strategies for determining the outcome of fights without physical damage."
195 "Thus, a body is more likely to survive if the brain is equipped with rules of property incorporating evolutionary stable strategies ("ESS") for reducing the costs of allocating resources among competitors." 196 Other scholars give additional reasons for the development of property rights including that they involved territorial possession, 197 that they developed as a method to control cheating, 198 that they evolved as an incentive to get people to work, 199 and that survival is based on the use of things. 200 This author believes that the last two reasons are particularly important; an individual should generally be able to keep the fruits of his labor because they are necessary for his survival. Finally, all these reasons contribute to the cohesiveness of the social contract by motivating cooperation and cutting down on free riders.
Professor Stake proposes that "humans might be programmed with three rules for initially allocating rights in a thing: to the first person to touch the thing, or to the older contestant, or to the dominant member of the group. . . ."
201 Particular cultures would then determine the details of these rules. 202 For example, a "first-in-time convention" (possession) might have developed because humans fight harder for something they already possess, which means that deferring to the person who was first in time can avoid harmful violence for both parties. 203 Part of this convention would be rules for determining who is first in time, for example, a person who first controls a wild animal has title to it. 204 Thus, "[t]he result is that most of us descended from beings who could correctly determine who was first in time according to the convention." 205 Our mirror neurons and the related ability to form triadic mental representations of mental states were involved in the development of property rules. Professor Stake has written:
[W]e may be programmed to recognize when we have a certain proximate relationship to a physical object and, by mirroring, to recognize when others have a similar relationship to an object. Our brains may then determine 'ownership' by combining that relational data with information about previous relationships, such as information about who was first in time and what voluntary transfers have occurred.
In addition, property rights are not based on a utilitarian, cost-benefit analysis. 212 For example, the property right to prevent trespass to land is absolute; it does not depend on a cost-benefit analysis that the trespass would or would not be beneficial to society. 213 Accordingly, economic development takings where the government takes property from an innocent party and awards it to another party who can make better use of it are not justified. While the new use might create a bigger pie and produce favorable externalities, such as better business in the neighborhood, such takings go against our basic instincts concerning the sanctity of property.
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Eminent domain under such circumstances constitutes immoral coercion of innocent parties. 215 While the Supreme Court disagreed in Kelo, 216 the strong criticism against the holding of this case 217 supports the proposition that property is an instinctive, moral right. As Professors Merrill and Smith have declared: "Coercing innocent persons to give up their homes and farms in order to bestow favors on the select few, however, crosses the line of what most persons are prepared to countenance, consistent with popular perceptions of morality."
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Behavioral biology also supports intestate succession (and similarly inheritance by will). Intestate succession is a way of transferring property (resources for survival) to those who share a person's genes, thus furthering the survival of the individual's genes. 219 Since closer relatives, such as children and parents, share more of the donor's genes, intestate succession laws favor closer relatives rather than distant ones. 220 These laws also favor spouses, who are unrelated genetically to the donor, because favoring spouses increases a spouse's investment in his or her children. 221 Furthermore, "[e]volutionary pressure could have shaped brains to send property where it will be most efficiently deployed"-where it has a greater chance of furthering the donor's genes. 222 For example, primogeniture may have arisen because "[u]nder primogeniture, a decedent's land passed to a 212 Merrill & Smith, supra note 194, at 1851. They add that "we will argue that the forms of utilitarianism that undergird modern law and economics which assume a degree of plasticity of property and have underplayed the information and coordination problems present in core property situations are inconsistent with the nature of the rights in question." Id. at 1856-57. 213 Id. at 1871-74. 214 And, a stretched reading of the Constitution. The Takings Clause says public use, not public purpose. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 215 218 Merrill & Smith, supra note 194, at 1884. Professors Haidt and Bjorklund have argued: "Traditional utilitarianism, for example, does an admirable job of maximizing moral goods derived from the harm/care foundation. However, it often runs afoul of moral goods derived from the fairness/reciprocity foundation (e.g., rights), to say nothing of its violations of the ingroup/loyalty foundation (why treat outsiders equal to insiders?), the authority/respect foundation (it respects no tradition or authority that demands anti-utilitarian practices), and the purity/sanctity foundation (spiritual pollution is discounted as superstition Society often limits a person's ability to leave property to one's relatives through inheritance taxes. Such taxes are often necessary for the good of the society-to support public projects. However, when a society takes too much of a person's property upon death, it negates human nature. Part of the incentive to work is to leave property to those who share one's genes. Studies have shown that the elderly do not consume all of their resources so that they can transfer those resources to their kin. 224 Taking too much of a person's property upon death destroys that incentive to work.
In sum, because property rights are a basic part of human evolution and morality, they have greater importance than many modern courts and writers have given them. 225 Not only are they hardwired into our brains, they are also tied into our personhood and autonomy.
226 Accordingly, they are equal to other basic rights, such as the right of liberty or the right of equal treatment. As Professor McGinnis has asserted: "[i]f property is natural to man, a government that ignores the interests of mankind in property and exchange does so at its own peril."
C. A RIGHT TO FAIRNESS
Fairness is universal, and mankind's sense of fairness is based on the "Golden Rule" ("Do unto others as they would do unto you" and "Don't do unto others as you would not have them do to you"). 228 Our sense of fairness derives from our theory of mind working through our mirror neurons that allows us to identify with others. 229 As mentioned in Part II, the parts of the mind that we use in doing an action are often the same parts that perceive that action when it involves others. 230 229 As Professor Iacoboni has written, mirror neurons "show that we are not alone, but are biologically wired and evolutionarily designed to be deeply interconnected with one another." IACOBONI, supra note 50, at 267. Philosopher Thomas Nagel recognized that "[a]ny social arrangement governing the relations among individuals, or between the individual and the collective, depends on a corresponding balance of forces within the self-its image in microcosm." NAGEL, supra note 185, at 4. 230 See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text. 231 Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 64, at 1729. for me to hurt you." 232 Like the other rights mentioned in this paper, our sense of fair play helped individuals and groups survive because it produced evolutionary advantages over those individuals and groups that lacked a sense of fairness. 233 Humans innately sense when they are being treated fairly or unfairly by others. 234 "People judge fairness . . . both on the distribution of gains and on the possible alternatives to a given outcome;" 235 "reciprocal exchanges must be relatively equal . . . ." 236 In other words, one derives the fairness of an outcome (e.g., property, money, goods) from a comparison of one's outcome/input ratio to the outcome/input ratio of another. 237 Individuals have positive emotions when they are treated fairly and strong negative emotions when they believe that they have been treated unfairly. 238 The most common reactions to unfairness are anger, protest, spite, and outrage. 239 Similarly, "when a worker perceives that another with similar inputs receives greater rewards, that worker will reduce effort." 240 People are also sympathetic to those who have treated them fairly. 241 In addition, reciprocal altruism is a part of our sense of fairness: "whenever people treat each other in a fair, sympathetic manner, they are exhibiting an essential understanding of the importance of reciprocity." 242 Cooperation is connected with reward-related neural activity, 243 and it also depends on the other person's reputation. 244 Our sense of fair play probably first developed in sexual love and parental love and then spread to others in society. 245 In addition, our sense of fear, anxiety, and danger generally keeps us from harming others. 246 Similarly, "[p]eople define their norms of fairness through social processes; groups of people create norms and work to enforce them." 247 Evolutionary psychologists have used the "ultimatum game" to study fairness in humans. 248 The ultimatum game is a two player game in which A is given money to be divided between A and B in any portion A wants. If B accepts the offer, the players split the money, but if B rejects the offer, the players get nothing. One might expect that A would keep a very large portion (say 90%) for selfish reasons and B would accept a small portion (say 10%) because at least he would get something. However, A generally offers an average of 40%, and B usually rejects offers below 30%. This shows that "[h]umans have built-in regulators, evolved over aeons of intense social interaction, that tells us not to be unfair to each other, lest today's player A will become tomorrow's player B." 249 In addition those who receive unfair offers (those in the position of B) will often reject those offers even if he loses something, too, due to B's sense of fairness and the desire to punish those who are unfair.
250
Our sense of fair play appears in brain activity that neuroscientists have detected and tracked. 251 For example, neuroscientists have observed that unfair offers activate areas of the brain connected with both cognition and emotions. 252 In addition, some neuroscientists believe that there is a Golden Rule hormone-oxytocin-which is produced in the hypothalamus and which may have evolved in connection with motherly love. 253 Oxytocin increases feelings of trust, both in being willing to trust and creating trust in others. 254 Finally, studies have shown that when humans have strong moral convictions concerning a matter, they are more interested in substantive fairness than procedural fairness. 255 
D. LIBERTY RIGHTS
Liberty rights derive from the autonomy of human beings. Man has a natural desire for liberty because it helps the autonomous individual survive by allowing choice.
258 "Evolutionary theorists realize that there is more than one possible goal or end to human life and that end which is chosen may depend in large part on the circumstances in which an individual finds himself." 259 In other words, "[w]e need liberty in order to make up for our lack of knowledge of diverse human ends, and the diverse understanding of human ends leads to a justice in which each man lives according to his own conscience, as opposed to that of another." 260 Furthermore, "[a] just society recognizes when it has squelched the individual, deleting the political conception of self."
261 Finally, liberty is necessary for diversity in society; a group needs individuals who can perform specialized functions. In sum, liberty facilitates the experience and the natural genetic variations among human beings.
Mirror neurons facilitated the development of liberty rights. Through our theory of mind, along with our emotions of empathy, sympathy, and responsibility, an individual can see that others should be treated in the same way that the individual is (given the same liberty).
During the EEA, man was completely free (liberty is prior to the state). However, by entering into a social contract (which increases an individual's ability to survive), man must give up some liberty, but only the liberty which is necessary for society's protection. 262 Liberty is what man receives from the social contract in exchange for what he gives society; liberty is part of reciprocal altruism on the societal level. In addition, the more liberty a society allows its inhabitants, the more likely those inhabitants are to remain part of that society. Liberty also breeds personal responsibility: "[b]y taking away freedom we essentially deny that the individual has any responsibility for himself, negating his moral worth, and further negating the possibility for political friendship between citizens." 263 As Professor Lauren Hall has noted: "[a]s autonomous individuals, selected by natural selection with certain desires and needs, we alone hold the responsibility 258 Hall, supra note 183, at *11, *13, *16. "Hunter-gatherer societies, with relatively egalitarian social structures, would have allowed little direct physical coercion since few would have the requisite power necessary to exert such control." Id. at *10. Throughout history, humans have taken great risks to protect their freedoms. RUBIN, supra note 46, at 113. 259 Hall, supra note 183, at *10. Professor Arnhart has written that "[t]he human good is variable insofar as what is desirable for human beings varies according to individual temperament, individual history, social custom, and particular circumstances." ARNHART, supra note 115, at 17. He has identified twenty natural desires that are rooted in human nature and which vary in the individual and a particular society based on the above factors: "a complete life, parental care, sexual identity, sexual mating, familial bonding, friendship, social ranking, justice as reciprocity, political rule, war, health, beauty, wealth, speech, practical habituation, practical reasoning, practical arts, aesthetic pleasure, religious understanding, and intellectual understanding." Id. at 29. See also RUBIN, supra note 46, at 14 ([H]umans are highly individualistic."). 260 Hall, supra note 183, at 10. 261 HAUSER, supra note 24, at 187. 262 According to John Locke, "[a]nything that is not transferred remains beyond the government's authority, still as a matter not of power but of right." WEINREB, supra note 3, at 132. This is based on "the assumption that the individual is fully formed prior to any action of the state." Id. at 133. 263 Hall, supra note 183, at 25.
for our own survival and that of our children." 264 Moreover, since liberty is part of human nature, groups that grant more liberty will generally work more efficiently and require less coercion. 265 Finally, when people have liberty rights, they do not have to fight for liberty, thus increasing their survival chances.
That liberty is a central part of human nature does not mean that individuals should be allowed to do whatever they please. 266 As Professor John Rawls recognized, "arguments for restricting liberty proceed from the principle of liberty itself."
267 By entering into society, individuals must obey the group's rules, or the group will collapse. While this may restrict the individual somewhat, it increases the survival chances for all.
Society can also limit liberty when that liberty interferes with another individual's liberty. 268 As discussed in detail in the next section, individuals are equal under the social contract, which increases their chances of survival. For example, criminal laws interfere with liberty, but such laws are necessary to protect other individuals. Similarly, government can step in when someone is overreaching in the marketplace.
Society, however, should only restrict individual liberty when it is necessary for the good of society. This means that there should be few restrictions on "morality." For example, since homosexuality does no real harm to society, it should be permitted. On the other hand, society can restrict sexual activity when there is the danger of harm, such as protecting children by banning sex between adults and children.
Slavery is the opposite of liberty because it takes away all liberty rights. It also treats an individual as a means to an end. As Professor Larry Arnhart has noted, humans are not naturally adapted for slavery. 269 A slave has no autonomy and no dignity, which are central to man's nature. Slavery also goes against mankind's natural moral sense, which was shaped by natural selection. 270 In particular, slavery contradicts man's moral sense not to be exploited. 271 In addition, a master/slave relationship lacks the reciprocity that is central to society based on human nature. Slavery also interferes with liberty because it interferes with the subcategories of liberty 264 Id. at 25. 265 See id. at 2. 266 Professor Hall has asserted that "[j]ust as in the classical liberal tradition, evolutionary liberty is not simply license, doing whatever one wants to win the evolutionary race." Id. at 2. She added: "Evolutionary liberty . . . is liberty within the constraints of other aspects of human nature. . . . To protect social relationships, natural selection has instilled in us a moral sense which prevents (most of the time) our desire for liberty from becoming a desire for license." Id. at 22. 267 John RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 213 (2d ed. 1999). 268 Herbert Spencer "took it for granted that restraints to prevent a person from 'directly or indirectly aggressing on his fellows' were not only consistent with liberty but essential to it." WEINREB, supra note 3, at 132 (quoting THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 27 (Ind.: Liberty Classics) (1981)). Similarly, J. S. Mill wrote that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 96 (1951) . Although this author generally agrees with Mill, Mill's statement is based on a utilitarian view of law, while this author's view derives from biology. 269 See ARNHART, supra note 115, at 161. 270 Id. 271 Id. at 163, 169. discussed below, such as the right of association, the right to choose one's mate, and the right of parents to raise their children as they please.
Liberty rights are the basis of many of our more detailed rights like the right to privacy or the right to free speech. "What makes liberty different from . . . other human goods is that it embraces more political goods than any other good can, and it leaves man to choose the goods which fit his particular circumstances and attributes."
272 Fundamental to liberty is the right of privacy. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court formulated a broad concept of the right of privacy:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.
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This broad concept of privacy is consistent with the right to liberty which is intrinsic to human behavior and the social contract. The state should not be a dominant presence in areas where it has no interest; man did not give up all his natural freedom when he entered into society. The state should not interfere with a person's home, unless there is a significant reason to do so, such as protection of a child or a spouse. Because intimacy between human beings is an essential part of human nature, intimacy should be especially protected from state interference. Also, outside the home people should be able to do as they please, as long as it does not interfere with a significant state interest or another person's liberty. As Lawrence noted, freedom of thought, belief, and expression are essential to autonomous human beings. Man was free before the social contract to think, believe, and express himself as he pleased. Society does not have a reason to interfere with those natural freedoms except in extreme circumstances.
Another part of liberty is the right of free association. Free association furthers productivity and thus survival because it allows individuals to work with whomever they please. It allows an individual to develop a life plan with the help of others. It also helps hold society together because a lack of free association could cause individuals to exit that society.
Another part of liberty is the freedom to choose one's spouse. As noted above, mate selection is a central part of evolution because it affects reproductive success. 274 A related liberty is the liberty for parents to raise their children as they please, unless the parents pose a risk of danger to the children. Experiments in kibbutzim where children were raised communally were failures because of human nature-mothers did not want to give up their children. 275 In addition, children are better off with their parents because parents give more attention to their children because they carry their genes.
E. RIGHT TO EQUAL TREATMENT
There is no equality in the natural world. The powerful rule, and the weak are eaten. This is, of course, part of the evolutionary process.
Equal treatment came into the biological picture when man created the social contract. As stated earlier, when mankind developed societies, individuals gave up some of their liberty in exchange for the survival benefits of living in a society. Although individuals gave up some liberty, equal treatment from the government was part of the bargain because no one would enter into a society to be treated as an inferior, especially if this would decrease survival chances. Professor Thomas Nagel has summarized this basis of equality best:
The pure ideal of political legitimacy is that the use of state power should be capable of being authorized by each citizen-not in direct detail but through acceptance of the principles, institutions, and procedures which determine how the power will be used. This requires the possibility of unanimous agreement at some significantly high level for if there are citizens who can legitimately object to the way state power is used against them or in their name, the state is not legitimate.
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Similarly, the sense of fairness discussed above requires that leaders treat their subjects equally. Individuals demand equal treatment from their sovereigns, and our emotions are brought into play when we see that others are not treated equally. Finally, equal treatment is required as part of the respect that autonomous human beings deserve-all persons are moral equals. 277 Professor Dworkin wrote that "majoritarianism does not guarantee self-government unless all the members of the community in question are moral members . . . ."
278 Further, as Professor Lloyd Weinreb has asserted: "Each person should be able to develop and grow as a person; he should have a sense of his own capacity as an actor in the world, who makes things happen according to his own plans." 279 This is Thomas Jefferson's "pursuit of happiness." Equality under behavioral biology means equality of opportunity, not equality of outcome. Equality of outcome is contrary to the evolutionary supra note 19, at 201 ("The resistance of children to arbitrary or unusual socialization has been the downfall of many utopian efforts."); Hall, supra note 183, at 7. 276 NAGEL, supra note 185, at 8. 277 Writers have generally based equality on an individual's humanity. WEINREB, supra note 3, at 167; RAWLS, supra note 267, at 442 (explaining that "the capacity for moral personality" is a sufficient condition for the entitlement to equal justice). 278 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 23 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW]. Professor Dworkin added that "[m]oral membership involved reciprocity: a person is not a member unless he is treated as a member by others, which means that they treat the consequences of any collective decision for his life as equally significant a reason for or against that decision as are comparable consequences for the life of anyone else." Id. at 25. 279 WEINREB, supra note 3, at 175.
process. 280 If everyone were made equal, the survival chances of all would diminish. Incentives to help society would disappear because individuals who worked hard would not reap the benefits of their work. Moreover, if individuals did not receive a significant portion of their labors, they would leave the society, and the social contract would fall apart. As Professor Hall argued: "[w]hile there are certainly evils in inequality, the coercion necessary to create absolute equality (if even possible) would be worse for human psychology and the overall quality of human life than the inequality which presently exists." 281 Similarly, equality of outputs ignores individual autonomy, which is basic to humans and necessary for survival. As Professor Weinreb has asserted:
Unlike equality of opportunity, which recognizes persons as distinct actors who exercise individual capacities, the central significance of equality of result is that it denies the relevance of individuality in some respect. Where equality of result applies, persons are not actors who determine for themselves; they are recipients (or donors) who, whatever their individual characteristics, receive (or donate) according to a general rule that they are individually unable to vary.
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He added that "[o]ur common humanity does not consist of or depend on particular characteristics that all have alike. On the contrary, its essence is our common capacity for individual self-determination as a unique person."
283 Finally, differences in outputs is not unfair. As Professor F.A. Hayek noted, "[a] bare fact, or state of affairs, which no one can change, may be good or bad, but not just or unjust." 284 More specifically, Professor Paul Rubin has asserted that inequality exists generally because "some individuals are vastly more productive than others. . ." and that productivity is good for society as a whole.
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While a few scholars have noted that some hunter-gatherer societies were egalitarian, this is a different type of egalitarianism than is sometimes advocated for today. 286 This egalitarianism was not a concern for others, but 280 In addition, Professor Weinreb believes that equality of result "is not a comprehensible human goal." Id. at 161. He continues: "Since measures to eliminate various kinds of designated group inferiority, such as racial and sexual discrimination, are strongly supported on moral grounds, the principle of equality itself acquires moral credentials. Nevertheless, the achievement of equality between one human being and another or among human beings generally, for its own sake, is not a possible moral objective. rather a desire not to be dominated. 287 Thus, individuals banded together to avoid the creation of a dominant hierarchy.
288 Accordingly, this dominanceavoiding type of egalitarianism supports the argument that human behavior resists attempts to impose artificial equality by dominance, as was argued in the previous paragraph.
Mankind does have a sense of minimal distributional fairness, 289 which is probably the result of our theory of mind. Studies have suggested that mankind has adopted the "principle that maximized the overall resources of the group while preventing the worst off from dropping below some preestablished level of income." 290 This allows "for extra benefits to flow toward those who contribute more to society," while providing "a safety net for those who are disadvantaged…." 291 In other words, while equality in human nature is equality of inputs, not outputs, there may be a right to minimum subsistence.
Establishing equality of opportunity as the basis of equal treatment does not entail the adoption of "Social Darwinism." Social Darwinism, which is generally associated with Herbert Spencer, is not consistent with behavioral biology or for that matter with Darwin himself. Darwin's theory was not a theory about progress, and his evolution was not to a positive end. 292 More importantly, Social Darwinism is contrary to the biological basis of rights set forth in this paper. A theory of human nature that views certain individuals as superior interferes with natural property rights, fairness rights, liberty rights, and equal treatment rights.
Equality means that society cannot discriminate based on superficial differences such as race. Behavioral biology demonstrates that one should be judged by individual characteristics, not as members of an artificial group to which one belongs. "One of the downsides to essentialist thinking and certain aspects of categorization more generally is that we readily develop stereotypes and prejudices." 293 Because there are an astronomical number of possible genetic combinations, each human is genetically unique. On the other hand, behavioral biology also demonstrates that there is little difference between the races. 294 There has not been enough time in the human evolutionary process for significant differences to occur among localized populations.
295 Professor Goldsmith averred, "Even when members of different human populations look different and when there are demonstrable difference in gene frequencies underlying physical characteristics, the presumption remains that cultural differences reflect 287 Id. 288 Id. 289 HAUSER, supra note 24, at 83. 290 Id. at 88. 291 Id. 292 GRAEFRATH, supra note 17, at 373. 293 HAUSER, supra note 24, at 212. See also Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 102, at 496 ("Yet biology offers no support for the existence of discrete genetically distinct populations of humans different from each other in important ways."). 294 PINKER, supra note 24, at 143 ("People are qualitatively the same but may differ quantitatively. The quantitative differences are small in biological terms, and they are found to a far greater extent among the individual members of an ethnic group than between ethnic groups or races."). 295 Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 102, at 477.
alternative phenotypic expressions of a common genetic heritage." 296 In other words, when one shows that the mind is the same in all humans, unimportant biological aspects like skin color become irrelevant.
In addition, equal treatment under behavioral biology should not be limited to a traitist approach, but should protect all individuals from differing treatment by the government. For example, the Jeffersonians stood for "equal rights for all, special privileges for none." 297 In other words, the minority should be protected from the majority, regardless of the characteristics of the minority and majority. As the court declared in State v. Goodwill:
[T]he rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule of law that governs every other member of the body politic under similar circumstances; and every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the same thing by restricting the privileges of certain classes of citizens and not others, when there is no public necessity for such discrimination, is unconstitutional or void. Were it otherwise, odious individuals or corporate bodies would be governed by one law, and the mass of the community, and those who make the law by another one.
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The court, of course, was stating a version of the rule of law.
F. SOME IMPLICATIONS
From the above, it should be clear that sometimes there is not just one right answer to rights questions. Different right-creating behaviors (from different modules in the brain) can conflict. In addition, different cultures realize fundamental rights in different ways.
For instance, behavioral biology sometimes does not supply an answer when equality rights and liberty rights clash. Both are vital for human survival and holding together the social contract. As Professor Weinreb remarked, "[i]n a just social order we believe, liberty and equality are consistent, because the law establishes what we call equality of opportunity: not equality as such but the proper bounds of liberty, within which all persons alike are allowed to exercise their individual capacities." 299 However, he also admitted that in any society there will inevitably be clashes between liberty and equality. 300 While liberty rights are probably much older than equality rights since liberty rights probably existed before the social contract, equality rights are also important because, as stated above, they help hold the social contract together and they relate to mankind's sense of fairness. In addition, the answer to the question of how liberty relates to equality varies by culture, with the 296 emphasis on liberty or equality probably being determined by that culture's combination of the Haidt-Joseph five moral modules.
Another implication from the above is that anthropocentric rights should generally prevail over utilitarianism (cost-benefit analysis). 301 Darwinists are individual oriented. 302 Under Darwinism, society grows out of the individual, not the other way around. While the social contract is important, under behavioral biology, individuals are more important because they are autonomous beings and they had total liberty before the social contract. Individuals are the basic unit of the social contract. In addition, utilitarianism can interfere with property rights, liberty rights, fairness rights, and the right to equal treatment. For example, while it may be socially beneficial for the government to turn over an individual's house to a developer who will build a mall that will economically improve the neighborhood, this violates an individual's property rights as discussed above. As Professor Rawls declared, "[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." 303 In other words, "utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons." 304 In addition, a neuroscientific study of patients with damage to the ventrodemial prefronal cortex, a part of the brain involved with social emotions, supports the proposition that humans value the individual over the utilitarian answer. 305 These brain damaged patients acted in a much more utilitarian manner than normal individuals when faced with a high conflict personal dilemma, such as the trolley problem. 306 Thus, a system of rights based on human behavior will adopt the Kantian notion of not using an individual as a mean to an end. 307 In addition, "[t]he concept of morality's producing the greatest good for the greatest number is consistent with evolutionary principles only when the interests of individuals are very similar." 308 On the other hand, when basic behavioral rights are not involved, it is perfectly legitimate to adopt a costbenefit utilitarian approach to law making. 309 
IV. BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS IN PARTICULAR CULTURES
A. BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION Judge Hoffman believes that there is an evolutionary link between justice and democracy:
The ability of any justice system to accommodate the biological tension between individual freedom and social norms depends to a great extent on its own ability to develop those norms as a free expression of social consensus. The best laws work because they efficiently confer, and express, enough long-term benefits on enough individuals that those individuals are willing to remain in the group and pay the short-term price of compliance. The genius of democracy is that it provides a continuous feedback mechanism on those social norms, constantly recalibrating them to current individual preferences.
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Thus, "democracy creates a market for the governed, in which conflicting preferences for individual freedom and social restraint compete freely to obtain optimal results." 311 This connection between justice and democracy is not an artificial social construct, but rather shows the effect that conflicting notions of individual freedom and social constraints have had on the evolution of mankind. 312 In addition, a free market economy furthers this connection because it allows for reciprocal exchanges, which, as noted above, are essential to human nature. 313 More specifically, Professor McGinnis believes that "biology-the interaction of genetically shaped behavior with particular environmentsbetter explains the structure of the [United States] Constitution than other theories . . . ."
314 He continues, "[t]he vocabulary with which the Framers discussed human nature is in fact close to that now used to describe the elements of human nature from an evolutionary viewpoint." 315 Similarly, "Jefferson argued that American colonists 'felt their rights before they had thought through their explanation.'" 316 We actually have two constitutions: 1) the original Constitution, which mainly dealt with the imperfections of human nature though a division of sovereignty; and 2) the Bill of Rights and other amendments, which granted specific rights. In the original Constitution, the Framers tried to address four human factors (all of which have been discussed above): 1) that self-interest created limitations on altruistic behavior among unrelated individuals; 2) that self-interest could be consistent with "gains from trade 310 Hoffman, supra note 109, at 1674. 311 Id. 312 Id. 313 Id. 314 McGinnis, supra note 37, at 212. 315 Id. at 212-13. 316 Dershowitz, supra note 8, at 42. Professor Strahlendorf has elaborated: "Natural-law philosophers have stated that there are a set of basic human values that are 'self-evident.' This means that humans sense that these values are good. . . . The point here . . . is . . . to suggest that there must be sets of biological mechanisms (epigenetic rules and Darwinian algorithms) that make things 'self-evidently' good." Strahlendorf, supra note 104, at 154. through cooperation because man has a natural sense of exchange and property"; 3) that "individuals have substantial differences in their natural endowments, creating peculiar risks of expropriation through politics"; and 4) that "the natural desire to increase status may, in some circumstances, be less beneficial to society as a whole than wealth production."
317 Stated differently, "[t]he Framer's whole new science of politics was premised on this view of human psychology: government could not depend on man's benevolence or virtue." 318 In particular, "[w]hat was unique about James Madison and the Founding Fathers, however, was not just that they based government on the consent of the people, but that they based government on individuals and a people that they understood to be not always virtuous." 319 On one hand, the Framers believed that man's self-interest worked well in the private sphere because it created gains in commerce. They protected the private sphere by giving Congress the authority to regulate trade through the Commerce Clause, rather than allowing states to do this separately, and by protecting property and trade through the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause (part of the Bill of Rights). 320 On the other hand, the Framers feared factions and abuses of power in the public sphere. 321 The Framers were particularly concerned about the protection of property. 322 As Professor McGinnis has written, " [u] nder the Framers' system, national democracy was primarily an attempt to preserve wealth from public expropriation that could result from coalition building." 323 In other words, "[n]atural inequality exacerbates the danger of factions because it creates a reserve of individuals readily persuaded to expropriate the property of the more talented." 324 The Framers dealt with this problem through separation of power between the federal and state governments (federalism), bicameralism, and separation of power between the federal government's three branches. 317 McGinnis, supra note 37, at 231. 318 Id. at 232. 319 was only when Americans began to reflect upon factionalism in state legislatures, and to consider how to avoid the evils of that phenomenon, in a revised federal government, that more robust concentrations of separate branches and powers in a single government began to emerge."). As James Madison wrote:
[i]n the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 357 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 322 White, supra note 321, at 981-984. Professor White continues: "the idea of protection for the property rights of individuals can be said to have been implicitly understood by Americans as part of their heritage as British subjects. . . . As resistance to British policy toward the colonies widened in the 1770s, Americans began to assert that because they were not represented in Parliament that body had no authority over them at all. In the evolution of this argument, protection of property rights of individuals became a way of concretizing the theory that government existed to secure the 'natural' rights of citizens, and when it transgressed on those rights it lost its legitimacy." Id. at 981-982. 323 McGinnis, supra note 37, at 235. 324 Id. at 234.
While the original Constitution mainly protected against human nature by division of authority, the Bill of Rights directly created rights, some of which are very specific while others are abstract. As this part will show, these rights are details of the rights discussed in Part III based on the culture of late eighteenth-century America.
Our freedom of speech right in the First Amendment flowed from the natural right to liberty. As noted in Part III, freedom of thought and expression are part of man in the EEA, and man did not give up this liberty when he entered into the social contract. However, this liberty can be limited when harm to others is involved, such as defamation or falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater. Freedom of speech also arises from individual autonomy and dignity. "We retain our dignity, as individuals, only by insisting that no one-no official and no majority-has the right to withhold an opinion from us on the ground that we are not fit to hear and consider it." 325 Likewise, government interferes with our autonomy and dignity when it prevents us from expressing our opinions to others. Finally, free speech promotes reciprocity and cooperation. 326 The details of freedom of speech differ among cultures. For example, the United States generally limits speech less than European nations. "[T]he U.S. First Amendment is far more protective than other countries' laws of hate speech, libel, commercial speech, and publication of national security information," and this greater protection grew out of America's "peculiar social, political, and economic history." 327 Other constitutional rights are less obviously grounded in biology, but most of the Bill of Rights relates to human behavior. The Third Amendment states, "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." 328 Obviously, there was no specific right against quartering soldiers in a home on the savannah. 329 However, this right is a specification of the right to liberty and privacy. The British quartering soldiers in colonists' homes was a specific problem related to liberty, which the Founders protected against in the Constitution. Notice that this right is narrower in war time when greater incursions on liberty might be justified for survival.
Similarly, our Second Amendment right to bear arms 330 was not a part of mankind's early rights. Nevertheless, it relates to an individual's interest in personal autonomy and liberty. Under these concepts, an individual has the right to protect oneself. 331 As Professor Hauser has stated, "[w]e can break self-defense down into factors that feed into our moral faculty" because "[t]he agent's intention . . . is not to kill the thief but to defend himself from being killed." 332 Thus, the Second Amendment right to bear arms is a late eighteenth century manifestation of the right to protect oneself. Likewise, the criminal procedure rights in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury are manifestations of the rights to fairness and liberty discussed above. For example, while the right to a jury trial is not universal, 333 it is one of America's methods of insuring the biological right to fairness.
Finally, the Ninth Amendment supports the proposition that, for the Founders, rights are in the people (individuals), and individuals do give up their basic rights when they enter society. The Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 334 Thus, the people created the government and gave it its authority. The government did not grant rights to individuals; they already had these rights. As Professor Randy Barnett has written, the Founders' view was "first come rights, and then comes the Constitution." 335 Professor Barnett believes those rights to be liberty rights, and he has proposed a "Presumption of Liberty" when interpreting the Constitution. 336 This corresponds with the arguments above that one gives up only a necessary portion of liberty when entering into the social contract.
B. LIBERTY IN AMERICAN AND GERMAN LAW
One can see how different cultures create different kinds of liberty by comparing our Constitution's idea of liberty with that of the German Constitution. Our constitutional liberty is a negative liberty (a freedom from government)-"the freedom to pursue one's own vision in life, as one chooses." 337 American liberty is valueneutral and is based on individuality and personal choice. 338 In contrast, German freedom is based on the Kantian notion of human dignity-"that each person is valuable per se as an end in himself, which government and fellow citizens must give due respect." 339 German rights are based upon the free development of personality and thus on a person's integrity and security. 340 For example, in one case, the German Constitutional Court "invalidated a court-ordered sampling of a defendant's spinal column to test his involvement in a crime on the ground it violated his physical integrity." 341 Similarly, confidentiality and inquiry into certain personal matters are carefully protected under the German system. 342 This idea of dignity affects both public and private law. 343 For instance, the German Constitutional Court recast "the private law interests of reputation and privacy into the capacious language of human dignity and personality, thereby constitutionalizing the doctrine." 344 In addition, German freedom rejects the American notion of the atomistic individual, and instead it views individuals as being connected. 345 In other words, "[i]ndividual choice is bounded by community, civility norms and a sense of the responsibility." 346 Consequently, unlike American liberty, German freedom creates both rights against the state and duties for citizens. 347 Under the German conception of freedom, "people are spiritual-moral beings who act freely, but their actions are bound by a sense of moral duty. Actions are to be guided by a sense of social solidarity, human and social need, and personal responsibility." 348 This coupling of rights and duties developed from Kant's notion of universal law that applies to all. 349 Examples include a parent's rights and duties in raising children and the German notion of academic freedom that does not release anyone from his allegiance to the Constitution. 350 The German version of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) applies to both law and justice, and justice can include natural or moral law. 351 Another important idea under German freedom is the "Social State (Sozialstatt), which obligates the state to provide for the security of its citizens, including a minimal level of existence." 352 Neither the American concept of liberty based on freedom from government nor the German concept of freedom based on dignity is superior. Rather, each developed from human behavior based on the needs of the particular society. Americans were rebelling from an English king and parliament, which limited their freedom. They also feared factions within their own country. Consequently, they were most interested in protection from government. Based on the existence of slavery, the eighteenth century status of women, and differences between landowners and non-landowners and other class differences, the idea of universal human dignity was not central to the Founders. 355 Similarly, because individuals had abundant access to land they could farm and other natural resources, providing for each member of society was a foreign concept.
The German idea of dignity is based both on the German reaction to the atrocities of Nazism and Germany's intellectual history. 356 After World War II, Germans had to face the horrors of Nazism. The country's reaction was to emphasize the dignity and autonomy of human beings. Freedom from government was not enough to protect society; rather, positive action from the government and duties of citizens were necessary. Also, part of the Nazi intrusion was into the private sphere, which helped them identify Jews and other "undesirables." Further, in an industrialized society with a greater population, equality is a greater problem and not all people have access to basic resources. 357 This Article has tried to counter this argument by showing that there a universal, innate set of rights that evolved to help mankind survive. While the details of rights differ by culture, the fundamental rights that exist in all societies, especially the autonomy of all humans, demonstrates that Hitler was wrong.
Similarly, Professor Dershowitz has argued against natural law: "[b]ut we must remind ourselves that natural law has also been invoked in support of slavery, racism, sexism, homophobia, terrorism, the blocking of abortion clinics, and the refusal to pay taxes."
358 First, almost all philosophies have been used to justify evil. If a philosophy is misused, it doesn't make that philosophy bad. More importantly, earlier versions of natural law were mainly based on opinion, not science. For example, homosexuality is not against scientifically supported natural law or natural morality, but rather homosexuality may serve a natural function. 359 The anthropocentric version of rights employed in this Article is based on extensive scientific studies. 355 Professor White has noted that modern civil liberties were not a concern of the drafters and that the idea of equality was muted in the founding era. White, supra note 321. 356 Science has given us a better view of human nature, and legal scholars can use that better view to create a better legal system. While there is still much work to be done, any investigation of law that ignores the facts of human nature will be seriously flawed. As Professor Alasdair MacIntyre declared, " [t] he notion that the moral philosopher can study the concepts of morality merely by reflecting, Oxford armchair style, on what he or she and those around him or her say and do is barren." 360 been able to have more children as a result of their presence: "The homosexual members of primitive societies could have helped members of the same sex, either while hunting and gathering or in more domestic occupations at the dwelling sites. Freed from special obligations of parental duties, they would have been in the position to operate with special efficiency in assisting close relatives." Id. 360 ALASDAIR C. MACINTRYE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY ix (1981) .
